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Abstract: This paper addresses a specific problem that may
arise as consequence of the globalization of the markets. This is
the incompatibility between local and global standards of trust.
The literature highlights the advantage of co-localization for the
production of mutual trust. However, the type of trust produced
may be informal and indeed largely incompatible with base of
trust in open electronic commerce. This paper focuses on the
glocalization of trust, the concurrent development of local and
global standards of trust.  It has two major goals. Identifying the
major factors influencing the local production of global-codified
trust. Addressing three alternative strategies local system
implements to create compatibility: de-coupling, coupling and
loosely coupling. We address some initial evidences in the case of
a de-coupling district.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper Steinfield and Klein [1] address the issues
of local versus global electronic commerce. The emergence
of a global digital infrastructure is seen as one of the major
engine of the globalization of the markets and the ‘death of
distance’. However, as the two authors suggest, there are
many reasons for the continued vitality of regions in the era
of global electronic commerce, including among others:
1. Capitalizing on local expertise;
2. Capitalizing on existing trust;
3. Investment in logistic and digital infrastructure.
Their paper address local and global as alternative
dimensions. However, as conclusive remark they highlight
the increasing relevance of the concept of ‘glocalization’, the
concurrent development of both dimensions, as research
issue.
This paper focuses on ‘glocalization’ from a specific angle,
that is the problem of incompatibility between local and
global standards of trust. The literature on local production
system highlights the benefits deriving from a common
localization in leveraging the production and re-production of
trust. The type of trust produced, however, is mainly tacit,
based on contextual assumptions, and indeed inaccessible to
parties located outside. As consequence of globalization of
the markets and diffusion of open and digital infrastructures
the market is demanding for an increment of the level of
trust-codification. Local systems are faced with the
interaction between two contradictory requirements. The first
is to increase their capacity to produce codified-trust in order
to increase or maintain their competitiveness in the global
markets. The second is to reduce the level of codification
produced in order to preserve the competitive advantages
associated to the use of tacit trust in the local system.
This paper has two major goals. The first is to define the
major factors influencing the capacity of local systems to
respond to the increment of the global demand of codified
trust. The second is to define a set of strategies local
production systems may implement to achieve compatibility.
We identify three major strategies: de-coupling, coupling and
loosely-coupling. The first is based on the development of a
strong local leadership, which has the major function of de-
coupling the local production of trust from the global demand
of trust. The second, coupling, is based on the development
of local system of trust production structured according to
global standards. The third, loosely coupling, is a mix of the
two. It is based on a large group of local leaders whose major
function is, on the one hand, to guarantee the trustworthiness
of the system, on the other, to increase the visibility and
cohesiveness of the system on the base of open and codified
standards. As we shall see the feasibility of each strategy
depends on three major factors: level of local inertia, sector
and market position of the community, and leadership
structure.
We support our thesis with some initial evidence from a
case study of a de-coupling industrial district. Powell [2]
defines an industrial district as a network of place, a socially
integrated, decentralized production system composed mainly
of small and medium and export oriented production unit.
The object of the case study is the eyewear district of Cadore,
a valley located in the Dolomiti-Alps 100 km north of Venice
specialized in the production of glass-frame. It is
characterized by a strong private leadership, which is not
equally distributed among four leaders. As we shall see this
leadership inhibit the process of codification of contextual
trust and the influence of public leadership in trying to divert
the cycle. The case study is the result of semi-structured
interviews with the two major private leaders, the major
public leaders and 10 enterprises equally distributed among
the following three categories: follower, specialist and
subcontractor.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE
A. Trust
In the literature trust is defined as positive expectation
about behaviors and intentions of another parties. Some
authors define trust as unilateral choice. Others instead
consider trust as mutual relation between two or more parties.
The first mainly focuses on the contextual motivations behind
the trust-decision. The second definition instead abstracts
from the specific situations and focuses on the motivations
underlying the existence of trust between persons. We refer to
trust as mutual relationship existing between two of more
parties comprising the positive expectation and confidence
about their respective trustworthiness.
In order to review the vast literature on trust we refer to the
categorization proposed by [3], which distinguishes among
three major perspectives: under-socialized, over-socialized
and embedded. The major advantage of this categorization
respect to others proposed in literature is that it refers to
different conceptualization about human nature and
rationality. The under-socialized perspective is based on the
assumption of economic rationality, behaving according to
the maximization of the self-interest. The perspective is
under-socialized because assumes a strong individualism of
human nature. The over-socialized perspective instead is
based on the assumption of normative rationality, behaving
according to a set of norms and values shared within a
community. The assumption is over-socialized because
assumes that individual behavior is mainly function of a set
of social rules previously internalized. According to [3] both
perspectives share a common assumption, that is atomization
of society and non-influence of ongoing social relationships
on individuals’ behavior. In the embedded perspective social
relationships are fundamental element of social behavior. On
the one hand, they regulate and enforce the respect of social
rules embedded and shared within networks. On the other,
they support the social production and reproduction of norms.
In the under-socialized perspective trust is defined as
economically rational and calculus-based choice, which
depends on the information available and its relative
credibility. 1 Institutional and formal mechanisms of controls
substitute the lack of trust between parties. Three are the
major forms of institutionalization of trust: structural and
procedural mechanisms, selection mechanisms and insurance
mechanisms [6].
In the over-socialized perspective trust is defined as form
social capital that arises in community characterized by the
prevalence of positive norms and values [7,8]. The base of
trust is endowed prevalently in the tradition and historical
development of the community. Internalizing trust requires
long period of apprenticeship. However, because of its nature
of cultural- and ethical-habit, it is also hard to modify or
destroy [7].
In the embedded perspective trust is also defined as social
capital. However, differently from the over-socialized
perspective trust is embedded in the connectivity and
cohesiveness of the network structure [3,9]. Trust evolves
both within relationships and network structure with the time
and frequency of interaction [10,11,12]. Lewicki and Bunker
[11] describe the life cycle of relational trust. Three
sequential stages characterizes the development of trust
within a relationship: calculus-based, knowledge-based
(mutual predictability of the respective behaviors) and
identification-based (mutual internalization of the respective
preferences and goals). Similarly, Ring and Van de Ven [12]
describes the development of inter-organizational cooperative
relationships as cycle process of negotiation, commitment
and execution. The initial formal content of the agreement is
gradually embedded in a network of informal agreement and
social relationships until it guarantees efficiency and
reciprocity in the relationship.
                                                          
1 See among others [4] and [5].
B. The role of IT in supporting Trust
In the previous section we review the literature on trust
distinguishing among three perspectives. This section uses
the same three categories to interpret the different
perspectives on the role of IT in supporting trust.
In the under-socialized perspective IT is a substitute for the
lack of trust. Authors belonging to this tradition mainly
highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of IT as substitute
for the lack of trust. The theoretical framework of reference is
mainly transaction cost theory, which postulate opportunism
as the main character of human nature [13]. Williamson [13]
suggests the existence of a trade off between internal costs
(hierarchical) and external costs (market) of coordination and
control, which depends mainly on transaction-complexity and
-idiosyncrasy. Malone et.al. [14] suggest that IT reduces
transaction costs providing the technological base for an
overall shift toward proportionally more market coordination.
IT impacts on the structure of transaction costs in three major
ways: reducing the unitary cost of processing information,
reducing the searching cost (electronic brokering) and
reducing the switching costs. Clemons et.al. [15] separate the
problem of coordination, explicit coordination, from the one
of ownership, internalization. Explicit coordination is a form
of coordination characterized by a strong operative and
strategic coupling between two or more legally independent
parties. They [15] suggest that IT support the transition
toward intermediary form of coordination and control,
between market and hierarchy. Two are the major reasons:
maximization of resources productivity and minimization
transaction risks. Miles and Snow [16], in their
conceptualization of dynamic networks, suggest that the
broad access to computerized information systems is a
substitute for lengthy trust building process based on
experience. Their idea is that participants to a network agree
on general structure of payment per value added and monitor
their respective contributions through continuously updated
computerized information system.
The over-socialized perspective contrasts the idea that the
development of trust is functional to the development of
common inter-organizational information system. They
suggest that trust is embedded on a shared context of positive
norms and values grounded in the history and in the tradition
of a community. Due to their tacit and abstract nature the
functionality of these norms and values can not be engineered
in computerized systems. Fukuyama [7] suggests that trust do
not resides in computerized system and, since community
depends on trust that is culturally determined, virtual
community will emerge in differing degrees in different
cultures. Fukuyama [7] concludes that only communities well
endowed of positive norms and values will be capable to fully
internalize the advantage deriving from the adoption of IOS.
This thesis, however, contrasts with the findings of Kumar
et.al. [17], which have shown that a common culture of trust
may inhibit the adoption of ‘communitarian’ information
system. Two are the major motivations. First, a common
culture of trust reduces the value associated to the adoption of
common IOS. Second, there is a difference between
relationship-oriented versus task-oriented communities. In the
first the communication is functional to the accomplishment
of the task. In the second it is also functional to the
development of the relationship. The consequence is that in
this second type of communities the communication is
comparably more interactive and broad than in task-oriented
community.
In the embedded perspective there is a concurrent
development between mutual trust and adoption of inter-
organizational information systems. Nohoria and Eccles [18]
suggest that there is a trade off between transaction-
complexity/uncertainty and adoption of inter-organizational
information systems. The higher is the transaction-
complexity and uncertainty the more parties relay on face-to-
face interactions to build a common base of trust and
understanding in business relationships. They suggest that the
adoption of IOSs is a good substitute for the lack of trust
within standardized business transactions, such as market and
hierarchical transactions. Differently, in the network form of
organization the adoption of IOSs goes together with a
proportional increment of the number of face-to-face
interactions. Hart and Saunder [19], similarly, suggests that
development of mutual trust in buyers-suppliers relationships
is a necessary condition to promote continuity in the process
of adoption of inter-organizational information systems. The
major motivation is that the development of mutual trust
facilitates the development of a shared vision about the
advantages deriving from sharing information.
C. Industrial districts and the problem of local versus
global
An industrial district, in its simplest conceptualization, is
defined as a spatial agglomeration of a number, usually a
large, of enterprises specialized in one or more phases of a
specific value chain dynamically and temporarily working
together to respond to specific market needs. This definition
is part of the flexible-specialization perspective on industrial
district.2 In this tradition the success of industrial districts is
explained as consequence of the development of flexible
technologies. Flexible technologies make economically
efficient to peruse strategies of specialization within a context
providing complementary services and productions. In this
perspective there is a strong parallelism between the
definition of industrial district and the one of network
organization. An industrial district is a network of place [2].
However, it is the concept of territory that makes industrial
districts so different from other forms of networking.
The territory is not simply, as classical economy suggests,
an empty geometric space, defined by transportation cost and
endowed with a given set of existing resources.3 The territory
has also an active role in shaping economic and social
actions. It is a social context characterized by specific social
conventions, institutions, competence, knowledge and
relational structure. All these elements play an active role in
shaping the process of territorial networking. We point out
two major consequences deriving from assigning to the
concept of territory and active role.
Industrial districts are embedded in historically defined and
socially constructed communities [23]. In this perspective an
industrial district is a spatially concentrated community of
many small and medium, technologically advanced, and
export-oriented enterprises. The sense of belonging to the
                                                          
2 See among others [21].
3 See for an extensive review of the subject [22].
same community of norms, values, meaning and knowledge
leverages the social production and re-production of mutual
trust and knowledge. This characteristic of industrial districts
is effectively captured by the expression industrial
atmosphere, which denotes the leading role played by the
social context for the success of the industrial district. The
industrial district, in this perspective, is defined as
communitarian market characterized by abstention from
opportunistic practice and a certain proclivity toward the
cooperation [24]. Furthermore, the cohesiveness of the social
and economic networks intensifies the value of individual
reputation asset and major mechanism of market selection.
Thus, the cohesiveness of the network structure in the district
is the major mechanisms underlying the reproduction of the
base of trust.
In order to highlight the leading role of the network
structure is useful to consider the milieu or network approach
[25]. In this perspective an industrial districts is defined as
local network of a global cognitive circuit continuously
converting contextual knowledge, which is mainly tacit, into
global knowledge, which is mainly explicit, and vice versa.
The efficiency of local systems and indeed of industrial
districts depends on the balance between openness and
closeness. The level of openness and closeness of an
industrial district is dependent from the number and
typologies of connection between local system and global
market. An excessive closure, which mainly derives from a
limited number of direct connections with the global market,
implies a gradual impoverishment of the local resources,
consequence of non-appropriability. Conversely, an excessive
openness, consequence of a large number of direct
connections with the global market, implies the gradual
erosion of the cohesiveness of the local system and indeed of
the mechanism underlying the reproduction of the advantages
of localization. The sustainability of the local system is
indeed linked to the definition of local and versatile
integrators capable of translating local knowledge into global
knowledge and vice versa. In other words the function of
these integrators is to dynamically balance the level of
codification of the knowledge locally produced and its
accessibility, through open codification language, and vice
versa.
GLOCALIZING TRUST: COMPATIBILITY CREATION BETWEEN
LOCAL AND GLOBAL STANDARDS OF TRUST
The review of the socioeconomic literature highlights the
distinction between two major forms of trust, namely tacit
and codified. We borrowed these two terms from the
literature on knowledge management. These two terms are
used to address the distinction between knowledge of
experience (tacit) and knowledge of the code (codified or
explicit knowledge). The development of tacit knowledge is
consequence of the experience of interaction between subject
and object of knowledge. Its value is confined within the
boundaries of the context of experience. Codified knowledge,
instead, is abstracted from the context, through a set of
assumptions delimiting its applicability, and defined in the
form of logical sequence of predicates. The same concept
applies to trust. Trust is tacit when is value depends mainly
on contextual conditions, such as belonging to the same
community or being part of the same socioeconomic network.
The value of codified trust is independent from the context. It
has been previously abstracted from the context and codified
in the form of contractual and computerized digital
infrastructures.
The cost of accessibility to a certain resource, and indeed its
relative economic value, depends on two major factors: the
level of codification and diffusion of the codification code.
The more a resource is codified on the base of globally
shared standards the lower is the cost of accessibility to that
resource because the less its functionality is dependent on
contextual factors. However, a resource that is highly
codified may remain local for at least two major reasons. The
first is that the cognitive cost of learning the codification code
is high. This is the typical example of resources shared
among specialist. For instance, the cost of learning the
language of law is high for a person that is not lawyer. The
second reason is that there are property rights that prevent the
access to that resource to unauthorized persons. Furthermore,
there is a hidden cost associated to codification, which is the
loss of flexibility and adaptability to contextual situation.
In section II.B we review the prevalent perspectives on the
role of IT in supporting trust. The under-socialized
perspective, which is prevalent in the field of the IT, suggests
that the efficiency and effectiveness of IOS as trust
mechanisms implies a substitution of the tacit component of
trust. In the over-socialized perspective, instead, it is
suggested that the adoption of IT is functional to the
sustainability of the tacit component of trust.
The embedded perspective suggests that codified, and
indeed the development of IT, and tacit trusts dynamically
complement each other. In this perspective the adoption and
development of codified trust takes the form of a learning
process, whose major function is to support the conversion of
trust from tacit to codified and from codified to tacit. This
perspective is coherent with the one addressed in section II.C.
Local production system are interpreted as part of global
cognitive circuit. Their efficiency is dependent on the ability
to develop local and versatile integrators (meta-organizers)
between local and global (tacit and codified).
In developing our model we take this latest perspective as
starting point. The goal is to develop a model to explain
which are the major factors influencing the capacity of local
system to learn to produce global-codified trust. We assume
that as consequence of the globalization of the markets, on
the one hand, and the diffusion of global digital
infrastructure, on the other, the demand of codified trust
increases. The need for the local system to switch from one
model of production toward another based on codified trust
depends on the balance between cost of incompatibility and
benefit deriving from localization. The cost of incompatibility
is given by the cost of developing local converter, from tacit
to codified and vice versa, and the loss of market
opportunities due to incompatibility. The possibility to save
on local transaction cost and the opportunity to increase the
capacity of the local system to support the growth of local
small and medium enterprises give the advantages of
localization.
The learning capacity of the local system depends on three
major dimensions: the internal cohesiveness, the sector, and
the market position of the community. The internal
cohesiveness of the local system, on the one hand, underlies
the efficiency and effectiveness of the local production of
trust. However, in case of incompatibility, the internal
cohesiveness of the system produces inertia toward the
adoption of global-codified standard of trust. The reasons are
mainly two. The first is that the costs of switching from one
model to another are high. The second is the local base of
trust is source of competitive advantage for the local system.
Second, the cost of incompatibility is not uniformly
distributed among sectors. For instance in the automotive
industry this demand started in the early 80’ with the
transition toward just in time models of production. This
transition has implied large investment in inter-organizational
information systems and quality systems. In more traditional
sectors, such as textile, this transition is only at its initial
stage. Thus, the cost of incompatibility is higher in innovative
and capital intensive sector. It is relative lower in traditional
sectors. Third, the market position of the local community, at
least in the short-run, reduces the local perception of the
demand for codification. A community that is leader in some
sector has already a consolidated reputation in the market.
This reduces the need to invest in codification as way to
increase the reputation for trustworthiness and quality in the
global market.
The key factor influencing the strategic behavior of the
local community, however, is the structure and character of
the local leadership. Leadership can be characterized along
two major dimensions: symmetry and public versus private.
The symmetry of the leadership [28] defines the distribution
of power. A leadership is symmetric when the power is
distributed among a large number of parties. Conversely, a
leadership is asymmetric when the power is concentrated
among small number of powerful parties. The degree of
symmetry of the local leadership defines the individual
capacity of the local leaders to influence the dynamic
evolution of the local system. If the leadership is highly
asymmetric each of the leader is capable, independently on
the others, to influence the dynamic of the local system. If the
leadership is symmetric the local leaders need to cooperate in
the definition of common strategies of development. This
characteristic favorites the development of open and public
standards instead of closed and private standards. The
distinction between public and private leadership
characterizes the main goal of the leadership. Private leaders,
in fact, aim to maximize their internal profit whether public
leaders are interested to the maximization of the overall
welfare of the community. The two interests coincide until
the strategy of the private leadership is functional to the
maximization of the overall welfare of the community.
However, when the private leadership start to implement
strategies of globalization of the value chain or reducing the
competitiveness of the local system through strategies of
internalization there is conflict of interest between the two.
Furthermore, the existence of strong private leadership
diminishes the influence and the credibility of the public
leadership with the major consequence of reducing its
strategic role.  In the case of highly distributed leadership,
instead, the function of the public leader is to support the
cooperation among private leaders.
In our perspective three are the alternative strategies that
may be implemented to increase the level of compatibility
between local and global markets: de-coupling, coupling and
loosely coupling. The first strategy, de-coupling (fig 2.a),
characterizes local production system belonging to traditional
markets and with a strong local private leadership and global
market reputation. In this case the advantages of localization
are higher then the cost of incompatibility. The major reason
is that the global demand for codification is low. The local
leadership has the interest to reduce the production of
codified trust for two major reasons. The first is to reduce the
opportunity to enter the local network for its competitors. The
second is to reduce the risk of emergence of local
competitors. The local leadership de-couples the local and
global demand of trust investing in global reputation and
extending their control on the value chain both up-stream and
down-stream. In this perspective the adoption of IT remain
confined within the boundary of the local leadership. The
major risk associated to this strategy is that the welfare of the
local production system depends mainly on the success of the
leadership and their strategic behavior.
The second, coupling (fig. 2.b), characterizes local
production system belonging to innovative or automation
intensive sectors characterized by a strong leadership, which
may be either public or private. Furthermore, these sectors
tend to be characterized by high level of global competition.
Thus, the cost of incompatibility are higher then the benefits
of localization. The strategy of coupling is based on the
internalization, at the local level, of the model of trust
production adopted in the global market. The local leadership
externalizes most of the critical activities and productions. It
uses its power to enforce the adoption of inter-organizational
information systems and total quality control systems. Two
are the major limits of this strategy. The first is it implies
high initial investments. The second is that it dramatically
reduces the entry barrier, as consequence of codification of
the local trust base, jeopardizing the internal cohesiveness of
the local system.
The third strategy, loosely coupling (fig. 2.c), may take
place both in innovative and automation intensive sectors and
in traditional sectors. The rationality behind, however, is
different. In the first type of sector is mainly consequence of
the high cost of incompatibility whether in the seconds is
mainly consequence of the local competition. The strategy is
based on the development of a large network of local
integrator specialized in one part of the production process or
in specific type of production. The function of these local
integrators is double. The first is that of guarantor for the
trustworthiness of the system. In this perspective they provide
a combination of insurance-like arrangement and total quality
system to guarantee the trustworthiness of the system. The
second is to integrate the local system through the
implementation of IOS and certification systems. The system
is partially codified and partially tacit. The combination
between tacit and explicit evolves according to the evolution
of the demand. In order to maintain internal compatibility the
local leaders cooperate in the definition of common public
standards. The function of the public leadership is mainly to
support and facilitate the internal cooperation between local
private leaders. The major advantage of this strategy is that
the conversion takes place gradually and diffusely. This
reduces the initial investment and supports the process of
learning within the local system.
A CASE STUDY OF DE-COUPLING DISTRICT: THE CASE OF THE
EYEWER DISTRICT OF CADORE
D. Origin, development and prevalent culture of the district
Cadore is a valley in the province of Belluno, about 100-km
north of Venice specialized in the production of eyewear
frames. The district has a long history. Its origin can be traced
back to the XII century during the Venetian Republic. It
experienced a long period of depression after the break down
of the Venetian Republic. Finally, it has been revitalized at
the end of the previous century, when Angelo Frescura and
Lozza founded 1878 the first industrial firm of frames in
Cadore4. Nowadays, the district counts more than 10.000
enterprises producing 80% of the Italian production and about
50% of the world production. The initial development of the
district can be explained by a specific combination of
cultural/geographical and economic factors. The geographical
isolation, that to some extent still characterize the valley, has
favored the creation of a solid base of intra-community
relationships. The evolution of the district is the result of
continuous spin off promoted by existing companies. The
consequence of this process is an organization of the district
based on stable networks of informal relationships. The
underlying culture has been defined as individualistic, but not
egoistic. Cooperation and trust mainly resides in the vertical
relations.
Fig 2.a: De-coupling district
Fig.2 b: Coupling district
                                                          
4 The company of Frescura and Lozzo is the current Safilo.
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Fig. 2.c: Loosely coupling district
The recent evolution of the district is characterized by two
peculiarities: a long period of growth and the exceptional
profitability of the sector.5 Three are the major consequences.
A production-centered culture. In the last 25 years the major
problem has been producing and companies have a strong
tendency to concentrate their investment in production. Lack
of market selections. The exogenous growths of the demand
and the high profitability of the sector have reduced the
efficiency of the local market as mechanism of selection.
Systemic inertia and myopia, companies in the district tend to
run over the same successful model and incapable to reinvent
it.
E. Structure of the district
Private leadership: The leadership of the district is strongly
asymmetric and private. There are four market leaders:
Luxottica, Safilo, De Rigo and Marcolin. The role of
leadership, however, is not equally distributed. Luxottica in
1996 billed 4 times more than Safilo, 9 times more than De
Rigo and 19 times more than Marcolin. The strategy of the
leaders is characterized by two major elements: global
branding and vertical integration both upstream and down
stream. The strategy of branding is based on the acquisition
of reputation for quality and design through the payment
royalties to the major griffes (Valentino, Armani, Max Mara
etc.). Upstream the leaders have internalized large part of the
production process. They relay on local production capacity
only in the case of peak of demand or special type of
productions. The decision of internalizing the production
process is mainly motivated by the need to reduce the cost of
control. Strategic markets are controlled through local
commercial branches controlled with a quote of the capital
higher than 50% or through joint venture. Developing and
minor markets are controlled through contracts of
                                                          
5 The district in the last 25 years has experienced a
continuous growth. The profitability of the sector can be
highlighted by the following example. The cost of production
of a frame of medium quality is 8 Euro and its price for the
consumer is 75 Euro.
exclusiveness with local agents. The cooperation among
leaders is low and it is limited to the definition of common
standards linked to the reduction of the cost of duplication,
such the definition of common product identification codes.
The others:  The structure of the district is characterized by
three major typologies of company: specialist, producers and
sub-contractor. The specialists are companies specialized in
specific type of production, mainly small components (screw,
noses, face), accessories (mainly eyewear-cases), galvanic-
working and painting/enameling. The specificity of these
productions have favored the formation of leadership of
specialty not only locally, but also globally. These companies
are present in the major markets of production or
commercialization with their own commercial branches and
exclusive agents. They have maintained a strong relationship
both with the leaders and the other local producers. Thus,
they are strategic nodes of integration. They externalize large
part of their production to local sub-contractor with whom
they maintain long-terms relationship.
The producers are companies of small and medium
dimension producing and commercializing directly their
product. There is a distinction between two types of
producers: follower and traditionalist. The followers are
characterized by strategies of commercialization following
closely the on of the leaders, based on the acquisition of
royalty and promotion of their own brand and direct control
of the commercial channel. Traditionalists follow the
traditional model of commercialization, based on the
mediation of the wholesaler. Both types of companies
externalize large part of their production to local sub-
contractors with whom they have long-term relationship.
The category of the sub-contractors represents the majority
of the companies localized in the district. These are mainly
small artisan companies. They can be either specialized in
one or more phase of the production process or to produce the
finished frame. These companies do not have any relationship
outside of the district and indeed they are completely
dependent from the success of their major clients in the
district.
Public leadership: Four are the major public leaders
directly involved in the strategic development of the district.
These are industrial and artisan association, Certottica and
local chamber of commerce. The associations play two major
functions: political lobbying and provision of services. The
services provided are the traditional ones:
fiscal/quality/innovation advisory, export consortia and so
forth. Certottica is a center of certification. It is financed
directly by Veneto Innovazione, the regional agency for
innovation, local industrial associations and Anfao, the
national association of the optical companies. The local
chamber of commerce is important in the district as leader
and coordinator of the collective operator for the eyewear
district. The collective operator is an association between the
local chamber of commerce, the two mountain-communities
of Cadore and Longaronese/Zoldano, and three associations
(Artisan, Industrial and small and medium enterprises). The
major function of the collective operator is to promote the
development of the district by promoting the creation of
innovative services and the diffusion of new technologies and
methodologies of production and management through a
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collective project called eyewear-village (Cittadella
dell’occhiale).
F. The digital infrastructure for electronic commerce
In the district there is not any common digital platform for
electronic commerce. The term digital infrastructure here is
used to describe the IT endowment of the different typologies
of companies identified above and their strategy of
development.  In general the diffusion of IT in the district is
low. Unfortunately there are no comprehensive data that
confirms such statement. A survey of 1995 evidences that on
a sample of 55 small and medium companies 87% have at
least one computer, 38% an internal network, 16% a mini-
computer, 22% a server and 38% a modem.
The structure of the information system of the leaders is
characterized by a ‘central server’ located in the companies’
headquarter and a network of ‘terminals’ located in the
commercial branches. The network is mainly used to update
the central system with data relative to the selling trend and
to automate the ordering cycle. None of the leaders have a
digital connection with their local suppliers. The central
system supports two major function:
accountancy/administration and production planning and
control.
The internal information systems of the others - small and
medium producers, specialists and subcontractors - is
functionally similar to the one of the leaders. Dimension and
structure of the information system are proportional to the
dimension of the company. The major elements of
innovations are enclosed in the strategy of development of
the specialists. These companies show a large propensity and
interest toward open technologies. For instance, the major
producer of accessory (Fedon) in the district is starting a
project to test an extra-net platform for customizing the
relationships with its clients.
Two major projects respectively aimed/aims to support the
introduction of a common digital platform for electronic
commerce in the district. The first, financed by a local saving
bank and sponsored by the local industrial association, was a
study of feasibility of an EDI infrastructure for the district.
The feasibility study was entrusted to Consozio Venezia
Ricerche, a research consortia that initially promoted the
initiative. The goal of the feasibility study was twofold:
verifying economic impact of the project, identifying a group
of initiators and a set of procedures to start with. The project
proposes two alternative strategies of development. The first,
sponsorship, based on the direct involvement of the leaders as
sponsor of the innovation. The second, institutional, based on
the creation of an EDI-center with the function of developing
and promoting the adoption of this technology. The first was
considered to be less feasible than the second one because
private leaders did not show any commitment to the project.
The second was proposed to the directive committee of the
industrial association, which rejected the proposal.  The
committee did not evaluate the development of this
infrastructure as useful for the competitiveness of the district.
Two are the major motivations justify such a result. The
district, at the time of the proposal, was in one of its period of
major growth. The second, the development of an EDI
infrastructure was considered to be the source of rigidity.
The second project is named local plan of action. It is
project promoted by the collective operator for the district.
The investment is of 6 billion Lire, 70% financed by the
public sector (regional government and European
Community). Two are the sub-projects relevant for the
codification of trust and the development of a common
platform for electronic commerce. The first is the
establishment of a common quality brand for the district. The
second project instead aim to develop an internet trading
system not only for selling products, but also for selling the
availability of production capacity. Both projects will be
finished in the year 2000. Thus, it is impossible to address
any conclusion on the result of these two projects. However,
during our interviews we have observed lack of information
about the two projects and a diffused skepticism, especially
among leaders and specialists, about their implications.
G. Discussion
The district of Belluno represents a strong version of de-
coupling district. In our conceptualization the leaders are
local interface between contextual trust and codified trust.
The case of Belluno shows that leaders, in order to increase
quality and control along the value chain, have internalized
the production process and minimized their dependence on
the district.
The case of Belluno evidences that the structure and cycle
of evolution of the sector influences the process of
codification of the trust-base. The growth of the demand and
high profitability of the process has contributed to the
development of production center culture in the district.
Furthermore, the continuous success has contributed to the
consolidation of the traditional business model based on the
informal base of trust. The major consequence has been the
inhibition of the searching process for systemic innovation
and efficiency.
The structure of the district has inhibited the process of
codification of contextual-trust. Confronted with the choice
of internalizing the production process or controlling it
through the development of inter-organizational information
systems, the leaders have choose the first option. The action
of the public leadership shows some difficulty to produce
some relevant influence on the dynamic of the district. In our
perspectives two are the major limits: lack both of credibility
and competence. The possibility of the specialists to drive
this process is limited by their position in the district. On the
one hand, the specialists are waiting for the leaders imposing
these modalities of networking. On the other, they have only
limited influence on the strategy of the followers. Finally, the
followers are not able independently to promote such
evolution.
In our perspective two are the possible alternative scenarios
that may change the current situation toward position more
compatible with the global demand for codification. The first
is based on the inversion of strategy of the leaders. The
second is based on the creation of new form of partnership
between public and private sector that aims to support the
creation of open forms of leadership.
The decision to reorganize the value chain may be
motivated by the need to reduce the operative cost in a
mature sector. This can move in two complementary
directions. The first direction is to increase the level of
cooperation between production and distribution. The second
is to increase the level of flexibility by externalizing the
production to a selected group of specialists and sub-
contractors that respond to certain parameters of quality and
trustworthiness. In this scenario the role of the leader is to
guarantee of the quality and trustworthiness along the value
chain and to provide services functional to the coordination.
IT here performs the major function of supporting
cooperation and control along the value chain. In this
perspective the leaders may cooperate in the definition of a
common open technological platform in order to reduce the
internal and the external cost of duplication. The past positive
experiences in the field of standardization may represent a
solid starting base.
The second strategy is based on the creation of open form
of leadership initially sponsored by the public leader. The
public leadership of the district has adopted a defensive
strategy to protect the district from the global competition.
The local plan of action moves in this direction. The
definition of quality brand for the district aim to qualify the
district with respect to the emerging countries. This strategy,
however, it is not sustainable in the long run. The public
leadership can play a positive role only if promotes internal
competition between alternative project. The goal of these
projects should be the creation of open forms of market
leadership. The nature of this leadership is not determined by
the absence of entry barriers, but by the definition of common
system of accrediting and control. The new leaders should
compete in their ability to guarantee the respect of the rules.
The higher is the level of trustworthiness generated the higher
the attractiveness of the community the higher is the
profitability associated to the participation to the community
and vice-versa. Information technology in this case could be
used to strength the cohesiveness of the industrial district
around multiple leaders.
H. Conclusion
This paper had two major goals: identifying the major
factors influencing the process of glocalization of trust and
defining strategies local systems implement to create
compatibility. We identified three major factors influencing
the capacity of local systems to produce global-codified trust:
the internal cohesiveness, the sector and the market position
of the community, and the structure of the local leadership.
We identify three major strategies of glocalization: de-
coupling, loosely coupling and coupling. Different contextual
conditions of application and different roles of IT in
supporting trust characterize each of this strategy.
The case of de-coupling district we present confirms most
of our expectations. The leadership-structure and strategy
inhibits the transition toward forms of electronic trust. The
public leadership is not capable to introduce any changes in
the dynamic of the district. The success and the structure of
the district, on the one hand, and the prevalent culture shared,
on the other, prevent that the transition may take place
spontaneously. At conclusion of our analysis we identify two
possible scenarios that may support the transition toward
position more compatible with the development of forms of
electronic trust. The first is based on inversion of strategy of
the leadership, which may decide to reduce the internal cost
of production and to increase its flexibility though inter-
organizational information systems. The second is based on a
partnership among followers, specialists and public
leadership. The function of the public leadership is, on the
one hand, to promote form of aggregation and, on the other,
competition among group on the definition of quality-
parameters.
This part of the research is only in its initial stage and it will
be object of further investigation. We will also analyze other
case studies responding to the other two models we develop.
Our goal is to develop six case studies belonging to different
sectors, innovative versus traditional, in order to cross-
analyze the dynamic of different form of leadership in the
two type of sectors.
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